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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to
hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1991).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court err in granting defendant's Motion for PIP
Setoff and ordering that $3,000.00 be deducted from plaintiff's
judgment totalling $9,000.00 in special and general damages when
the parties' stipulation was limited to the fact that the $7,815.00
in medical charges represented reasonable charges for the medical
services incurred by plaintiff as a result of the subject collision
and did not further provide that the medical treatments were
necessary or that the $7,815.00 amount would reasonably compensate
Plaintiff for his medical expenses?
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation
involving the application of Utah Code Ann.. § 31A-22-309(6) (Supp.
1992).

The appellate court accords the trial court's statutory

interpretations no particular deference but assesses them for
correctness.

State v. Rio Vista Oilr Ltd.. 786 P. 2d 1343, 1347

(Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann.. § 31A-22-309(6) (Supp. 1992), set forth below,
is determinative of the question at issue in this appeal:
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection
coverage is subject to the following:
1

(a) that where the insured under the policy is or
would be held legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been
paid by another insurer, including the Workmans'
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the
person who would be legally liable shall reimburse
the other insurer for the payment, but not in
excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by
mandatory,
binding
arbitration
between
the
insurers.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/appellee, Steve Quimby, agrees with the statement of
the case made by plaintiff/appellant, Winton Aposhian, to the
extent that it is supported by the record and, in addition,
pursuant to Rule 24(b), Utah R. App. P. (1992), makes the following
statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review:
1.

Plaintiff's

no-fault

insurer,

State

Farm

Mutual

Automobile Insurance Companies, paid Plaintiff $3,000.00 for PIP
insurance benefits prior to the trial of this action [T. 219].
2.

Windsor

Insurance

Group

was

Defendant's

insurance

carrier. [T. 215-219].
3.

Windsor Insurance Group received a PIP subrogation claim

notice from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies,
claiming reimbursement for the $3,000.00 it paid to plaintiff. [T.

4.

The trial

court

ordered

that the

jury verdict of

$4,000.00 for medical expense damages be reduced by $3,000.00,
representing the amount of the PIP subrogation claim of State Farm
2

Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies against Windsor Insurance
Group.

[T. 268-269].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Utah Code Ann., § 31A-22-309(b) (Supp. 1992), and relevant
case law clearly provide that the trial court's reduction of the
$4,000.00 jury verdict for medical expense damages by $3,000.00,
the amount of medical expense damages for which plaintiff had been
previously compensated by PIP benefits by his own no-fault insurer,
was the proper process to follow in order to prevent a double
recovery by plaintiff. Plaintiff thereby received exactly what the
jury determined he should to compensate him for the medical
expenses he incurred.

Plaintiff's arguments on appeal are faulty

because their only support lies in the erroneous assertion that the
parties stipulated to the amount of medical expense damages he
should receive, when in fact the stipulation established only that
the medical charges incurred by plaintiff "represent[ed] reasonable
charges for medical services... incurred as a result of the subject
collision, and ...may be entered into evidence without the need of
further foundation."
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REDUCING THE
JURY VERDICT BY $3,000.00, REPRESENTING THE
PIP SUBROGATION CLAIM, WAS PROPER AND SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff/appellant, Winton Aposhian ("Plaintiff"), describes
the

issue he advances on appeal
3

as being one of statutory

interpretation

involving

Utah

Code

Ann,.

§

31A-22-309(6)

(Supp.1992), which provides:
Every
policy
providing
personal
injury
protection coverage is subject to the
following:
(a) that where the insured under the
policy is or would be held legally liable
for the personal injury sustained by any
person to whom benefits required under
personal injury protection have been paid
by
another
insurer, including
the
Workers7 Compensation Fund of Utah, the
insurer of the person who would be held
legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in
excess
of
the
amount
of
damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amount shall be
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration
between the insurers.
Defendant/appellee, Steve Quimby ("Defendant"), submits that
§ 31A-22-309(6) provides authority for the $3,000.00 reduction in
the ultimate award ordered by the trial court judge in this case.
Plaintiff contends that in cases such as this where the injured
party has received less than the amount of damages he prayed for
and anticipated, § 31A-22-309(6) should be construed to produce a
result contrary to the rule that "a tortfeasor is not personally
liable to the injured insured for special damages previously
compensated by PIP benefits from the no-fault insurer."

Laub v.

South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304, 1307 (Utah
1982) .
The linchpin upon which Plaintiff's argument turns is his
mischaracterization of the scope and meaning of the Stipulation to
4

Summary

of Medical

Charges

and

jury

instruction

number 11.

Defendant did not stipulate that $7,815.00 was the correct amount
of damages to be awarded Plaintiff for medical expenses.

The

Stipulation to Summary of Medical Charges stated:
The
above-named
parties, through
their
respective counsel, hereby stipulate that the
summary of plaintiff's medical charges (a copy
of which is attached as Exhibit "A") represent
reasonable charges for medical services
plaintiff Winton Aposhian incurred as a result
of the subject collision, and that these
amounts may be entered into evidence without
the need of further foundation.
[T. 114 (Addendum at "A")].

The agreement that the charges for

medical services incurred were reasonable and that no foundation
was necessary is not the functional equivalent of an agreement that
those charges were reasonably and necessarily incurred.

The jury

that heard this case ascertained the amount of medical expense
damages to which plaintiff was entitled.
"C")].

[T. 206 (Addendum at

The jury was instructed: "$7,815.00 incurred in accident

related medical expenses.

Since the parties have so agreed, you

are to take these facts as true for purposes of this case."
174 (Addendum at "B")].

They awarded Plaintiff $4,000.00.

[T.
It is

that "judicial ascertainment of damages" that is the benchmark from
which the analysis of the issue before this court must proceed.
Utah law clearly provides that the trial court's reduction of
the ultimate judgment by the amount of the PIP benefits paid by
plaintiff's insurer was proper.

"[T]he tort-feasor's liability

insurer, in fulfilling its duty to respond to the claims of the
5

insured party to the limits of its policy, stands in the shoes of
its insured and pays on the basis of its insured 's personal
liability to the tort victim; this personal liability does not
include PIP payments.11

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d

1197, 1203 (Utah 1980).
[P]revention of double recovery is one of the
purposes of the Utah Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act.
And in keeping with that
purpose, we recently upheld a trial court's
reducing the special damages of a judgment by
the amount of damages previously compensated
by PIP benefits. Dupuis v. Nielsenf Utah, 624
P.2d 685 (1981).
Dupuis followed naturally
from our holding in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Ivie, Utah, 606 P. 2d 1197 (1980), that a tortfeasor is not personally liable to the injured
insured
for
special
damages
previously
compensated by PIP benefits from the no-fault
insurer, and that the injured party should
therefore not be allowed even to plead for
those damages. However, if a plaintiff does
improperly plead for previously compensated
damages and they are allowed to be included in
the judgmentf they court should, at the
conclusion of trial, either on its own
initiative or on motion of a party, reduce the
judgment by the amount of those previously
compensated damages. and thereby prevent
double recovery. (emphasis added).
Laub, 652 P.2d at 1307. The procedure followed by the trial court
in this case was precisely what was sanctioned by the Utah Supreme
Court in Laub.
Plaintiff attempts to dismiss the clarion mandate of Laub with
the patently false assertion that he did not recover the full
amount of medical expense damages he believes he was entitled to by
virtue of the Stipulation to Summary of Medical Charges.
6

What

Plaintiff fails to acknowledge is that the jury, after receiving
evidence of Plaintiff's medical expense damages, determined that
only $4,000.00 of those medical expenses were reasonably and
necessarily incurred and a proximate cause of the accident.

The

jury simply did not award Plaintiff the full amount he prayed for,
and

Plaintiff

has

not

challenged

the

jury's

determination.

Plaintiff's argument that "[T]he verdict did not award plaintiff
amounts for which he had been 'previously compensated,' "because
the jury's award fell more than $3,000.00 short of his expectations
is disingenuous at best. (Appellant's Brief at 10). It fails to
support his contention that Laub is factually distinguishable from
the case at bar.
Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Ivie is also an inapposite.

The trial of this action produced a

judicial determination that Plaintiff was entitled to $4,000.00 in
compensation for his medical expenses.

Plaintiff was paid that

amount; $3,000.00 in PIP payments and $1,000.00 by way of the
ultimate award of the trial court.
verdict, he has been made whole.

According to the jury's

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie

dedicates no different result, and Plaintiff's single argument
distinguishing his case from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie fails
because the Stipulation to Summary of Medical Charges did not
remove from the jury's consideration the question of the amount of
medical expense damages to which plaintiff was entitled.
In his discussion of Dupuis v. Nielsen, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah
7

1981),

Plaintiff

makes

the

contumacious

and

completely

unsupportable assertion that "[T]here is no dispute that, by the
jury's verdict, Plaintiff's damages had been reduced by more than
the amount of the PIP payments he has received." (Appellant's brief
at 11). This further stretch of Plaintiff's mischaracterization of
the

facts

is belied

by

the

fact

that

the

jury

determined

Plaintiff's medical expense "damages" to be $4,000.00 and that the
court properly reduced that amount by $3,000.00, the amount of the
PIP payments.

Plaintiff's medical expense "damages" were never

determined to be $7,815.00.

His expectation of receiving that

amount hinged upon his proving to a jury that it was appropriate.
The "double reduction" plaintiff complains of and which fosters his
reliance on Dupuis did not occur.
If this court were to accept Plaintiff's mischaracterization
of the scope and meaning of the Stipulation to Summary of Medical
Charges, the effect would be to confer upon him the "double
recovery" that Hill v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 864,
866 (Utah 1988) proscribes:
When the amount of damages incurred by the
insured has been judicially ascertained, the
extent of the subrogation right of the insurer
is usually undisputed.
The insured is not
entitled to double recovery, and the insurer
is equitably entitled to recover any amounts
from the insured that the insured recovered
from the tort-feasor.
The jury ascertained Plaintiff would be made whole by receiving
$4,000.00 for the medical expenses he incurred.
8

If Plaintiff

disputes that fact, he should have filed a motion for an additur or
a new trial.

See Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Dupuis

624 P.2d at 686. Because he did not avail himself of that remedy,
he cannot now claim he is entitled to any compensation for medical
expense damages beyond the $4,000.00 awarded by the jury.

The

trial court's reduction of that award by $3,000.00, representing
the amount of the PIP subrogation claim Plaintiff's no-fault
insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies, filed
with Defendant's insurer, Windsor Insurance Group, was proper under
§ 31A-22-309(6) and Utah case law.
CONCLUSION
The jury awarded Plaintiff $4,000.00 for his medical expense
damages.

He received that amount through the $3,000.00 PIP

benefits he was paid prior to trial and the additional $1,000.00
ultimately awarded to him after trial.

Under the authority of §

31A-22-309(6) and Utah case law, the trial court properly reduced
the $4,000.00 medical expense damages verdict by $3,000.00, which
represented the PIP benefits Plaintiff had previously received from
his own insurer.

The parties' Stipulation to Summary of Medical

Charges did not require the jury to award Plaintiff $7,815.00, and
his argument before this court rests entirely on the incorrect
assertion that it did.

His argument is therefore without merit.

Defendant requests that this court affirm the trial court's order
reducing the medical expenses verdict by $3,000.00, the amount of

9

the PIP benefits paid by plaintiff's insurer
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

IZ

day of January, 1994.

r^kNGSQ^RD & TSAKALOS

J. Tsaka&os
Peter L. Rognlie
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Steve Quimby
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Quimby, upon John Farrell Fay and Jim Mouritsen, counsel for the
appellant in this matter, by mailing the copies to them by firstclass mail, with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following
address:
John Farrell Fay
Jim Mouritsen
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620
Salt^^keTfcity, Utah 84107

Attorney f oj^ef endant/Appellee

10

£3SfS?B&TCG:j§37
Fhird Judicial District

FEB 2 2 1993

John Farrell Fay - (Bar No. 5691)
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-0999
Attorneys for Plaintiff

l\

ty Clerk
DepJty

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•—oooOOOO
WINTON APOSHIAN,

STIPULATION TO SUMMARY
OF MEDICAL CHARGES

Plaintiff,

Civil-No. 920900339 PI
-vsJudge Richard Moffat

STEVE QUIMBY,
Defendant.
The

ooobooo

above-named

parties,

through

their

respective

counsel, hereby stipulate that the summary of plaintiff's medical
charges (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A") represent
reasonable charges for medical services plaintiff winton Aposhian
incurred as a result of the subject collision, and that these
amounts may be entered into evidence without the need of further
foundation.
DATED this %£»—" day of January, 1993.
SM)»WED

.6 JENSEN

Attofteys Wpilaintiff
DATED this

IL

_

day ofv#arfl!ary, 1993,

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

sakalos
neys
for Defendant
At$#rn

Exhibit "A"

0114

INSTRUCTION NO.

//

Before the trial of this case, the Court held a conference with the lawyers for the parties.
At this conference, the parties entered into certain stipulations or agreements, in which they
agreed that facts could be taken as true without further proof. By this procedure, it is often
possible to save much time.
The stipulated facts are as follows:
$7,815.00 incurred in accident related medical expenses.

Since the parties have so agreed, you are to take these facts as true for purposes of this
case.

Exhibit

,!

B"

01 7 J

"' Mrd Judicial District

FEB 2 5 1993
•V.'. T ' AK2 MONTY |

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OOOOOOO

WINTON APOSHIAN,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 920900339 PI

STEVE QUIMBY

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.
oooOooo
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions. > lf you are persuaded
by the evidence in favor of the issue presented, answer
you are not persuaded, answer the question

lf

No.lf

fl

Yes.l!

If

In order to

answer each question, the agreement of only six jurors is required.
Any six jurors may agree on any question.

The same six jurors are

not required to agree to each question before moving on.
We, the jury, find by a preponderance of the evidence the
indicated answers to the following questions:
1.

Was Defendant

Steve Quimby

negligent

in causing

the

collision of November 28, 1990?
Answer:

Yes

J\

No

If you have answered "Yes" to the above question please go on.
If you have answered the above question "No" you will not answer
the remaining questions but will simply sign the verdict and inform
the bailiff.
1

Exhibit "C"

^

2.

Did Plaintiff Winton Aposhian sustain personal injuries

arising out of the automobile collision of November 28, 1990?
Answer:

Yes

3.

the

Was

X

No

negligence

of

Defendant

Steve

Quimby

a

substantial factor in causing the injuries which Winton Aposhian
suffered in the collision on November 28, 1990?
Answer:
4.

Yes

X

No

What amount of damages, if any, do you find Plaintiff

Winton Aposhian sustained as a proximate result of the injuries* he
sustained in the collision of November 28, 1990?
H;(?t?Q

Medical expenses:
General damages:

(Pain, Suffering &
Reduction of quality of life, etc.)

R; OOP

TOTAL:
DATED this c?S~ day of

.5~>0$Q

Fdhra&RJ

. 1993.

Foreperson "

2

nprp:

